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TREADING MURKY WATERS: THE THIRD 
CIRCUIT’S SEARCH FOR WHEN A CLAIM 
ARISES IN IN RE GROSSMAN’S, INC. 
Abstract: On June 2, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit in In re Grossman’s, Inc. held that despite a post-petition manifestation 
of injury, the tort claims of a woman allegedly exposed to a Chapter Elev-
en debtor’s asbestos-containing products arose pre-petition. In so hold-
ing, the court reasoned that a claim arises when an individual is exposed 
pre-petition to a debtor’s product giving rise to an injury, thus overruling 
its 1984 decision in In re M. Frenville Co. This Comment argues that al-
though the court examined two tests before determining when a claim 
arises under the Bankruptcy Code, it left the state of claim accrual law in 
the contingent tort claims context unclear. 
Introduction 
 In bankruptcy, there is a tension between the rights of a debtor to 
a “fresh start” and a creditor to due process.1 This tension is most 
common in cases where the creditor is a tort claimant who has been 
exposed to a debtor’s tortious product or conduct prior to the debtor’s 
filing of a bankruptcy petition, but has yet to manifest any injury.2 For 
these future claimants as well as the debtor, much hinges upon when a 
“claim” arises under the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) because if the 
claim arises pre-petition, it can be discharged by the Chapter Eleven 
debtor’s Plan of Reorganization.3 This issue is at the heart of In re 
Grossman’s, Inc., where, in 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit overruled its 1984 decision in In re M. Frenville Co to hold that a 
claim arises when an individual has pre-petition exposure to a product 
                                                                                                                      
1 See In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991); Dale Ellen Azaria, When 
Is a Claim a Claim? A Bankruptcy Code Riddle, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 205, 205 (1995) (describing 
the difficulty in determining when a claim arises under the Bankruptcy Code). 
2 See Ralph R. Mabey & Jamie Andra Gavrin, Constitutional Limitations on the Discharge of 
Future Claims in Bankruptcy, 44 S.C. L. Rev. 745, 759 (1993) (describing the constitutional 
complications of discharging future claims of those who have either yet to develop an as-
bestos-related disease or have no knowledge of their pre-bankruptcy exposure). 
3 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (2006) (stating that the confirmation of a plan dis-
charges the debtor from debt arising before the date of plan confirmation); Barbara J. 
Houser, Symposium on Mass Torts: Chapter 11 as a Mass Tort Solution, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 451, 
461–62 (1998). 
27 
28 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 
or other conduct giving rise to an injury, which underlies a right to 
payment under the Code.4 
 Courts have struggled to interpret the Code’s definition of “claim” 
in the context of future tort claimants seeking relief from a Chapter 
Eleven debtor.5 The Code defines a claim as a “right to payment, 
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-
dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, 
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”6 The breadth of this definition 
implies that Congress intended that a debtor would be able to address 
all legal obligations during the bankruptcy proceeding.7 
 Interpreting the definition of a claim under the Code, the Third 
Circuit in Frenville and Grossman’s took opposing views of when a claim 
arises.8 In Frenville, the Third Circuit narrowly interpreted the defini-
tion of a claim despite its expansive treatment in the Code.9 It focused 
on the “right to payment” language in the definition and concluded 
that a right to payment does not exist until there is a cause of action 
under applicable state law.10 In Grossman’s, however, the Third Circuit 
rejected the narrow Frenville approach and took a broader stance on 
when a claim arises under the Code.11 It held that an individual’s pre-
petition exposure to a debtor’s product or conduct constitutes a claim, 
even if the resulting injury manifests after the reorganization.12 To 
reach this conclusion, the court examined two tests circuit courts have 
used to determine when future tort claims constitute “claims” under 
                                                                                                                      
4 See In re Grossman’s, Inc., 607 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2010), overruling In re M. Fren-
ville Co., 744 F.2d 332, 338 (3d Cir. 1984). 
5 See Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort 
Liability, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2045, 2069–70 (2000) (discussing the inconsistency among 
courts in determining when a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes when tortious conduct 
occurred before plan confirmation but injuries resulted after). 
6 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2006). 
7 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 121 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 309 (1977), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266)); In re Remington Rand, 836 F.2d 825, 826 (3d Cir. 1988). 
Congress’s intent in providing a broad definition of “claim” in the Code is made explicit in 
the House Report. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 309 (stating that by using the “broadest 
possible definition,” the law was intended to allow a debtor to deal with all legal obliga-
tions, no matter how contingent, in the bankruptcy case and to provide the broadest pos-
sible relief in the bankruptcy court). 
8 Compare Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 125, with Frenville, 744 F.2d at 337. The two cases deal 
with the subject of claims in two different contexts: Frenville, in an indemnification context, 
and Grossman’s, in a context of tort liability for exposure to asbestos. See generally Gross-
man’s, 607 F.3d 114; Frenville, 744 F.2d 332. 
9 See 744 F.2d at 337. 
10 See id. at 336–37. 
11 See 607 F.3d at 121. 
12 See id. at 125. 
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the Code: the Conduct Test, which requires a debtor’s pre-petition tor-
tious conduct, and Pre-Petition Relationship Test, which requires both 
a debtor's pre-petition tortious conduct and some pre-petition relation-
ship between the debtor and the claimant.13 The Grossman’s court ulti-
mately applied a test most resembling the latter.14 
 This Comment argues that Grossman’s analysis of the Conduct and 
Pre-Petition Relationship Tests and its ultimate application of the latter 
not only demonstrate how similar the two tests are, but also add to the 
confusion over when future tort claims constitute “claims” under the 
Code.15 Part I introduces Frenville and its state law accrual test.16 Part II 
focuses on Grossman’s, highlighting the case’s facts and procedure and 
discussing the demise of Frenville.17 It then describes the court’s analysis 
of the Conduct Test and Pre-Petition Relationship Test, and its applica-
tion of a test similar to the latter.18 Part III analyzes the similarity be-
tween these two tests, recognizes issues that Grossman’s fails to resolve, 
and explains how the decision ultimately brings more confusion to this 
area of law.19 
I. The Frenville Accrual Test 
 In 1984, in In re M. Frenville Co., a Chapter Seven debtor’s former 
accounting firm, “A&B,” sought relief from an automatic stay to im-
plead the debtor-company, “Frenville,” as a third-party defendant to 
obtain indemnification under New York Law.20 A&B, an independent 
auditor and accountant for Frenville, sought this relief because several 
banks had filed suit against it for negligently and recklessly preparing 
                                                                                                                      
13 See id. at 122–23; see also, e.g., In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 
1995) (applying the Pre-Petition Relationship Test); Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 839 
F.2d 198, 202–03 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying the Conduct Test). 
14 See Grossman’s, 744 F.2d at 125. 
15 See infra notes 101–124 and accompanying text; see also In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 
F.2d at 1004 (noting that the court did not need to decide the difficult case of pre-petition 
conduct that has not resulted in a detectable injury); Azaria, supra note 1, at 205; Laura 
Bartell, Due Process for the Unknown Future Claim in Bankruptcy: Is This Notice Really Necessary?, 
78 Am. Bankr. L.J. 339, 342–43 (2004) (discussing the difficulty courts have had in apply-
ing different claim-accrual tests to individuals who have not been exposed to the debtor’s 
pre-petition conduct until after the bankruptcy filing or are unaware of the harm that may 
result in the future as a result of their pre-petition contact with the debtor’s product). 
16 See infra notes 20–33 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 34–70 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 71–100 and accompanying text 
19 See infra notes 101–124 and accompanying text. 
20 See 744 F.2d 332, 333–34 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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Frenville’s financial statements.21 Although no indemnification clause 
existed in the agreement, A&B prepared financial statements for Fren-
ville in the years prior to the petition for bankruptcy filed against Fren-
ville.22 Finding that Frenville’s liability resulted from its pre-petition 
acts, the bankruptcy court held that the automatic stay applied, barring 
A&B’s action.23 The district court affirmed.24 
 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and held that the automatic 
stay did not bar the indemnification claim.25 Although the conduct giv-
ing rise to the suit occurred before the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion, the court concluded that the claim arose post-petition because the 
cause of action stemming from that conduct arose after filing.26 Be-
cause claims arising post-petition are not subject to the automatic stay, 
A&B’s claim was not barred.27 
 In concluding that the claim arose post-petition, the Third Circuit 
narrowly construed the definition of “claim” under the Code.28 Focus-
ing on the right to payment language within the definition of “claim,” 
the court found that a right to payment for a claim does not exist until 
there is a cause of action under the applicable state law.29 Under New 
York law, an indemnity claim does not arise until the “prime obligation” 
to pay has been established.30 In Frenville, the prime obligation had not 
been established until the post-petition period, when the banks brought 
suit against A&B, spurring it to seek indemnification from Frenville.31 
As such, the court held that the claim arose post-petition, thereby ren-
dering the automatic stay inapplicable to A&B’s claim.32 Thus, under 
                                                                                                                      
21 See id. at 333. The complaint also alleged that the statements were false, and that be-
cause of reliance on them, the banks suffered losses of over five million dollars. See id. 
22 See id. 
23 Id. at 334. The Code states that a “petition . . . operates as a stay . . . of the com-
mencement or continuation . . . of an action or proceeding against the debtor that was or 
could have been commenced before the commencement of the case . . . or to recover a 
claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) 
(2006) (emphasis added). 
24 Frenville, 744 F.2d at 334. 
25 Id. at 338. 
26 Id. at 337. 
27 Id. at 335, 337–38. 
28 Id. at 336. 
29 Id. at 337. 
30 Frenville, 744 F.2d at 337 (quoting Burgundy Basin Inn v. Watkins Glen Grand Prix 
Corp., 379 N.Y.S.2d 873, 880 (App. Div. 1976)). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 337, 338. 
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Frenville’s accrual test, a valid claim exists under the Code at the time the 
claimant’s right to payment arises under state law.33 
II. In re Grossman’s, Inc.: Overruling Twenty-Six Years  
of Precedent 
 On June 2, 2010, the Third Circuit in Grossman’s rejected In re M. 
Frenville Co.’s state law accrual test.34 This rejection, however, left a gap 
in the Third Circuit’s jurisprudence as to when a claim arises.35 To fill 
the void, the Grossman’s court analyzed two tests courts have generally 
used to determine when a claim arises under the Code: the Conduct 
Test and Pre-Petition Relationship Test.36 In place of the accrual test, 
the court ultimately held that a claim arises when an individual is ex-
posed pre-petition to the debtor’s product or conduct giving rise to an 
injury, even if that injury manifests post-petition.37 
A. Facts and Procedure 
 The conflict at the heart of Grossman’s was between a tort claimant 
and a reorganized Chapter Eleven debtor.38 In 1977, Mary Van Brunt 
purchased products allegedly containing asbestos from Grossman’s, a 
home improvement and lumber retailer.39 Twenty years later, in 1997, 
Grossman’s filed petitions under Chapter Eleven.40 Under its Chapter 
Eleven Plan of Reorganization, Grossman’s merged with Jeld-Wen, 
which then served as its successor-in-interest.41 In addition to the mer-
ger, the Plan purported to discharge all claims arising before the date 
of Plan confirmation.42 
 When it filed its Plan, Grossman’s knew it had sold asbestos-
containing products and knew of the associated health risks.43 It also 
                                                                                                                      
33 See id. at 337; see also In re Grossman’s, Inc., 607 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2010). 
34 See In re Grossman’s, Inc., 607 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2010), overruling In re M. Fren-
ville Co., 744 F.2d 332, 338 (3d Cir. 1984). 
35 See id. 
36 See id. at 122. 
37 See id. at 125. Compare id. (focusing on the act giving rise to injury), with Frenville, 744 
F.2d at 335(stating that Congress has focused on the harm, rather than the act). 
38 See 607 F.3d at 117. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 117 n.1. 
42 See id. at 117. Under Chapter Eleven of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, a debtor can obtain 
a discharge of debts arising before the date of confirmation of the Plan of Reorganization, 
with debt defined as liability on a claim. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1141(d)(1)(a), 101(12) (2006). 
43 Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 117. 
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knew that personal injury claimants were suing asbestos manufactur-
ers.44 But Grossman’s was not aware of any product liability lawsuits 
based upon asbestos exposure filed against it.45 Grossman’s filed notice 
by publication of the deadline for filing proofs of claim but did not 
specifically suggest in the notice that it might have future asbestos li-
ability.46 Mary Van Brunt did not file a proof of claim at that time be-
cause she was unaware she had a claim:47 she did not manifest any as-
bestos exposure-related symptoms until about ten years after 
Grossman’s filing, when she developed symptoms of mesothelioma, a 
disease linked to asbestos exposure.48 Soon thereafter, the Van Brunts 
filed suit against Jeld-Wen.49 
 Jeld-Wen moved to reopen the Chapter Eleven case to obtain a 
court determination that the Plan discharged the Van Brunts’ claim.50 
Relying on the Third Circuit’s decision in Frenville, the bankruptcy court 
entered judgment for the Van Brunts, holding that the Plan of Reor-
ganization did not discharge their asbestos-related claims because they 
arose post-petition, when Ms. Van Brunt’s injuries manifested.51 The 
district court affirmed.52 Sitting en banc, the Third Circuit reversed and 
overruled Frenville, holding that the tort claim arose pre-petition despite 
the post-petition manifestation of Ms. Van Brunt’s injuries.53 
B. Overruling Frenville 
 By overruling Frenville, the Third Circuit in Grossman’s interpreted 
the Code to reflect Congress’s intent that “claim” be understood broad-
                                                                                                                      
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 117. Mary Van Brunt died in 2008 while the case was pend-
ing; her husband Gordon represented her estate in litigation. Id. at 118. 
50 Id. 
51 See In re Grossman’s, Inc., 389 B.R. 384, 390 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 400 B.R. 429, 433 (D. Del. 2009), rev’d in part, 607 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2010). The 
bankruptcy court stated that under New York law, the cause of action for an asbestos re-
lated injury does not accrue until manifestation of the injury, which in this case did not 
occur until 2006. See id. at 388. 
52 See Grossman’s, 400 B.R. at 433. Although the district court affirmed the bankruptcy 
court’s decision that the Van Brunts’ tort claim arose post-petition, it reversed the breach 
of warranty claim. See id. 
53 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 121. The Third Circuit then remanded the case to the dis-
trict court to determine whether a discharge of the claim would comport with due process. 
See id. at 128. 
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ly.54 The court found this intent in three different areas.55 Looking first 
to the text of the Code itself, the court reasoned that Frenville construed 
the term “claim” too narrowly.56 The Frenville court had decided that a 
right to payment—the threshold requirement of a claim— must exist 
before a claim could arise under the Code.57 In Grossman’s, however, 
the Third Circuit decided that the Code’s use of adjectives like “contin-
gent” and “unmatured” in its definition of “claim” indicated that Con-
gress intended to allow that a claim can exist before a right to pay-
ment.58 
  The Third Circuit next looked to federal bankruptcy reform, not-
ing that Frenville was out of sync with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978, which defined “claim” for the first time for Code purposes.59 Al-
though the Grossman’s court did not explicitly refer to the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898, Frenville’s logic hewed closer to this late nineteenth century 
act than to the modern law.60 Rather than broadly defining “claim,” the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 defined a “debt” as “any debt, demand, or claim 
provable in bankruptcy.”61 To be a valid “debt” under the 1898 Act, a 
tort claim had to be provable.62 As such, contingent tort claims could 
not be considered debts payable in bankruptcy.63 Frenville’s holding that 
                                                                                                                      
54 See id. at 121; see also In re Remington Rand Corp., 836 F.2d 825, 826, 829 (1988) 
(noting the Code’s broad definition of “claim”); H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 309 (1977), re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266. 
55 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 121. 
56 See id. 
57 See id.; Frenville, 744 F.2d at 336 (“‘[A]lthough the code definition of claim has been 
drafted in extremely broad terms, such definition may not confer the status of a claimant 
upon a petitioning creditor who has no right to payment.’” (quoting In re First Energy 
Leasing Corp., 38 B.R. 577, 581 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984))); see also Ralph R. Mabey & An-
nette W. Jarvis, In re Frenville: A Critique by the National Bankruptcy Conference’s Committee on 
Claims and Distributions, 42 Bus. Law. 697, 705 (1987) (critiquing Frenville’s narrow focus 
on the right to payment language in the Code). 
58 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 121 (discussing 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(a) (2006)). Section 
502(c)(1) of the Code provides further support of the broad definition of a claim. See 11 
U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (2006) (“There shall be estimated for purpose of allowance under this 
section any contingent or unliquidated claim, the fixing or liquidation of which . . . would 
unduly delay the administration of the case . . . .”). 
59 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101(4), 92 Stat. 2549, 2550 
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)); Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 121. 
60 See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549; Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 121; Frenville, 744 F.2d at 335–
37; Leonard J. Long, Bankruptcy Lesson of Future Mass Tort Claims: Potential Mass Tort Victims 
Should Have Catastrophic Injury Insurance, 16 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 357, 384–85 (1997) (discuss-
ing the nature of proving a claim in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898). 
61 See § 1(11), 30 Stat. at 544 (emphasis added); Long, supra note 60, at 384–85. 
62 Long, supra note 60, at 384–85. 
63 See id. at 385. 
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a claim did not arise until a right to payment existed under state law 
essentially conformed to the provability standard in the 1898 Act.64 
Congress, however, revised that standard in the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1978 by broadly defining “claim” to include contingent and un-
matured claims.65 If the Grossman’s court adhered to the narrow Fren-
ville reasoning, it would have effectively reinstituted the provability the-
ory, defeating congressional intent.66 
 Finally, the Third Circuit noted that Frenville conflicted with the 
principle that bankruptcy courts must administer and enforce the 
Bankruptcy Act and not the law of the state in which they sit.67 Con-
gress granted authority to the bankruptcy courts to enforce the Act and 
to determine when a claim arises.68 Frenville, however, relied on state 
law to determine when a claim arose—a reliance which other courts 
consider incorrect in light of Congress’s power under the Constitution 
to establish bankruptcy law.69 Thus, in overruling Frenville, the Third 
Circuit in Grossman’s brought the law in line with congressional in-
tent.70 
was critical to the court’s assessment of whether the scope of Gross-
                                                                                                                     
C. Filling the Frenville Void: The Dueling Tests 
 Having overruled Frenville and detached claim accrual from state 
law requirements, the Third Circuit in Grossman’s had to determine 
when a future tort claim arises under the Code.71 This determination 
 
64 See Frenville, 744 F.2d at 336–37; In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting Frenville’s adherence to a definition of claim that resembled the 
1898 definition). 
65 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–598, § 101(4), 92 Stat. 2549, 
2550 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2006)); H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 309 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266; Long, supra note 60, at 384. 
66 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. at 690; Mabey & Jarvis, supra note 57, at 705. 
67 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 121 (“The Supreme Court has stated that ‘a bankruptcy 
court does not apply the law of the state where it sits. . . . [B]ankruptcy courts must admin-
ister and enforce the Bankruptcy Act . . . .’” (quoting Vanston Bondholders Protective 
Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 162–63 (1946))). 
68 See id. (citing Vanston, 329 U.S. at 162–63). 
69 See, e.g., Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 198, 201–02 (4th Cir. 1988) (reason-
ing that claim accrual under the bankruptcy code should be determined under bank-
ruptcy law rather than state law and in accordance with the Constitution); see also U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 8 cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have the power to . . . establish . . . uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”). 
70 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 121; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 309. 
71 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 121. 
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man’s discharge would extend to the Van Brunts’ claims.72 Although 
the broad definition of “claim” included “unmanifested” or “contin-
gent” tort claims, how far could the definition of a claim be stretched?73 
Could a debtor’s pre-petition actions constitute a claim even though 
the potential claimant did not manifest an injury before the bank-
ruptcy petition was filed?74 To answer these questions, the Third Circuit 
looked at several other circuit courts’ analyses of two tests—the Con-
duct Test and the Pre-Petition Relationship Test—before applying a test 
most similar to the latter to conclude that a claimant’s pre-petition ex-
posure to the debtor’s product gives rise to a “claim.”75 
 The Third Circuit first considered the Conduct Test, under which 
a debtor’s pre-petition conduct giving rise to liability constitutes a claim 
for Code purposes.76 Because the Conduct Test focuses on when the 
debtor’s conduct occurred and not when the claimant’s injury accrued, 
“claims” arise and are subject to discharge in bankruptcy proceedings if 
the debtor’s conduct occurred pre-petition.77 This is so even if the re-
sulting injuries have not yet manifested.78 In 1988, for example, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied the Conduct Test 
in Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., and held that a woman fitted with a 
contraceptive device prior to the debtor-manufacturer’s filing for bank-
ruptcy had a pre-petition claim, despite her post-petition manifestation 
of injuries.79 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that because the device was 
                                                                                                                      
72 See id. at 122; Resnick, supra note 5, at 2067 (“[T]he effect of the debtor’s discharge 
. . . depends on the court’s construction of the definition of ‘claim’ and its determination 
as to when such a claim arises.”). 
73 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 123. 
74 See id. at 122 (stating that a broad discharge could disadvantage tort claimants whose 
injuries were caused by the debtor but have not manifested, and who therefore would not 
notify claimants of debtor’s liability); Houser, supra note 3, at 463. 
75 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 123, 125; see also, e.g., Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 
F.3d 1268, 1277 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying the Pre-Petition Relationship Test to hold that 
plaintiffs’ claim did not arise pre-petition because there was no evidence of any pre-petition 
relationship between plaintiffs and debtor); Grady, 839 F.2d at 202–03 (applying the Conduct 
Test to hold that plaintiff’s claim arose pre-petition because the debtor’s injurious conduct 
occurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition). 
76 See Grady, 839 F.3d at 199; In re Johns-Manville, 57 B.R. at 690. 
77 See Houser, supra note 3, at 464. 
78 See Bartell, supra note 15, at 343; Resnick, supra note 5, at 2070. 
79 See 839 F.3d at 203. In Grady, a pharmaceutical company manufactured and mar-
keted a contraceptive device which Mrs. Grady, the plaintiff, inserted before the company 
filed a petition for reorganization; the device caused severe injuries after the petition date. 
Id. at 199. Mrs. Grady sued the company two months after the petition and sought a deci-
sion in the bankruptcy court that her claim arose post-petition when her injuries became 
apparent. Id. Such a finding would mean that her claim would not be stayed by the auto-
matic stay provision of the Code. See id. 
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used before the company filed for bankruptcy, the debtor’s conduct 
occurred pre-petition, giving rise to a pre-petition claim.80 
 Although the Conduct Test reflects Congress’s intent to afford 
broad relief to debtors,81 the Grossman’s court noted that the Conduct 
Test has been criticized for stretching the Code too far.82 For example, 
the Third Circuit stated that the Conduct Test’s focus on the debtor 
ignores claimants and their relationship to the debtor’s acts.83 Most no-
tably, a court applying the Conduct Test need not ask whether the 
plaintiff was exposed to the debtor’s tortious conduct or product pre-
petition.84 As a consequence, under the Conduct Test, a pre-petition 
claim may exist solely based on the debtor’s tortious conduct, leaving 
claimants who develop injuries as a result of post-petition exposure to the 
debtor’s product subject to the debtor’s discharge.85 
 Recognizing these problems, the Third Circuit in Grossman’s turned 
to the Pre-Petition Relationship Test,86 under which some pre-petition 
relationship must exist between the claimant and the debtor’s tortious 
conduct for a “claim” to arise pre-petition under the Code.87 The rela-
tionship can stem from the purchase, use, operation of, or exposure to 
the debtor’s product.88 The theory driving this test is that potential 
claimants who have some relationship with the debtor will have a great-
er awareness of any claims they may have against the debtor.89 For ex-
ample, in Lemelle v. Universal Manufacturing Corp. the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit in 1994 found that without any pre-petition 
                                                                                                                      
80 See id. at 199, 203 (noting that the court was not deciding whether the plaintiff held 
a pre-petition claim for purposes of discharge, but rather whether the claim was subject to 
the automatic stay provision of 11. U.S.C. § 362(1)(a) (2006)). 
81 See Long, supra note 60, at 396. 
82 See 607 F.3d at 123 (citing In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 
1995)). 
83 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 123 (citing In re Piper, 58 F.3d at 1577). 
84 See Resnick, supra note 5, at 2071. 
85 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 123 (citing Resnick, supra note 5, at 2071); Houser, supra 
note 3, at 464. In these situations, however, issues of notice may arise which could preclude 
discharge. See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 123; Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346 (3d 
Cir. 1995). In addition to the test’s unfair inclusion of claimants who did not come into 
contact with the product until post-petition, the Conduct Test could also enable anyone to 
hold a claim against a debtor solely by virtue of potential future exposure to the debtor’s 
conduct or product. See In re Piper, 58 F.3d at 1577. 
86 See 607 F.3d at 123. 
87 See id.; In re Piper, 58 F.3d at 1577. 
88 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 123; In re Piper, 58 F.3d at 1577. 
89 See Lemelle, 18 F.3d at 1277 ( “[T]here must be evidence that would permit the debt-
or to identify, during the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, potential victims and 
thereby permit notice to these potential victims of the pendency of the proceedings.”). 
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contact, privity or other relationship with the debtor, plaintiffs whose 
rights relied on a future occurrence did not have pre-petition claims.90 
In Lemelle, the plaintiff alleged that the decedent’s death in a mobile 
home fire was caused by defendant’s defective mobile home design.91 
The design and manufacture of the home, however, did not result in 
any tortious consequence until a fire started years after the debtor’s 
bankruptcy Plan had been confirmed.92 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that 
without a pre-petition relationship, the debtor would not have been able 
to identify the claimant during the bankruptcy proceedings to afford 
the decedents proper notice.93 Thus, the plaintiff’s claims could not 
have arisen pre-petition to be subject to discharge under the Plan.94 
D. Choosing a Standard for When a Claim Arises 
 Following an extensive discussion of the two tests, the Third Cir-
cuit in Grossman’s oddly failed to identify explicitly the test it used to 
decide that the Van Brunts’ claim arose pre-petition.95 The court’s lan-
guage stressing pre-petition exposure to a product, however, reveals 
that it essentially adopted the Pre-Petition Relationship Test.96 Under 
the Grossman’s court’s test, a “claim” arises when an individual is ex-
posed pre-petition to the debtor’s tortious conduct.97 The similarity 
between this test and Pre-Petition Relationship Test is the requirement 
that an individual have pre-petition exposure to the debtor’s product.98 
Applying this test, the Third Circuit held that the Van Brunts’ pre-
petition exposure to the asbestos products gave rise to a claim.99 The 
                                                                                                                      
90 See id. 
91 See id. at 1271. 
92 See id. at 1277. 
93 See id.; see also In re Piper, 58 F.3d at 1577 (modifying test slightly to include pre-
confirmation relationship between debtor and claimant); In re Pettibone Corp., 90 B.R. 918, 
920, 931–32 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that there was no pre-petition claim where claimant 
sustained injuries operating company’s forklift after company filed for bankruptcy because 
there was no pre-bankruptcy contact or hidden harm that affected the claimant). 
94 See Lemelle, 18 F.3d at 1277–78. 
95 See 607 F.3d at 125 (“Irrespective of the title used, there seems to be something ap-
proaching a consensus among the courts that a prerequisite for recognizing a ‘claim’ is that 
the claimant’s exposure to a product giving rise to the ‘claim’ occurred pre-petition . . . .”). 
96 See id. at 123 (stating that pre-petition exposure gives rise to a pre-petition relation-
ship); id. at 125 (holding that a claim arises with pre-petition exposure). 
97 See id. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. 
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Third Circuit then remanded the case to the district court to determine 
whether a discharge of the claim would comport with due process.100 
III. The Similar Standards and Unresolved Issues 
A. The Similar Standards 
 The Third Circuit in Grossman’s applied its version of the Pre-
Petition Relationship Test after concluding that courts seem to agree 
that pre-petition exposure to a product gives rise to a claim.101 This 
conclusion reveals that the Conduct and Pre-Petition Relationship Tests 
are hardly mutually exclusive standards, as each assumes the existence 
of a pre-petition relationship in addition to a debtor’s pre-petition tor-
tious conduct.102 First, the Pre-Petition Relationship Test assumes a 
debtor’s pre-petition tortious conduct, and thus includes the Conduct 
Test within its definition of a claim; in fact, satisfying the Conduct Test 
is essentially the threshold requirement of the Pre-Petition Relationship 
Test because without a debtor’s tortious conduct, there can be no inju-
rious exposure to a product.103 For the Third Circuit, for example, to 
have found that the Van Brunts had pre-petition exposure to Gross-
man’s asbestos products, there had to have been some tortious conduct 
by Grossman’s, such as the sale of the asbestos products, allowing for 
such exposure.104 
 Second, the Conduct Test often assumes the existence of a pre-
petition relationship.105 Although the Third Circuit noted the existence 
                                                                                                                      
100 See id. at 125, 127–28. The court’s hesitation in discharging the Van Brunts’ claim 
rested on due process grounds. See id. at 125; Bartell, supra note 15, at 346. At the heart of 
the due process concern is the issue of notice, which is especially complex when the claim-
ant is unaware of the debtor’s liability. See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 125–26 (“Notice is ‘[a]n 
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be 
accorded finality . . . .’” (alterations in original) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank 
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950))); see also Chemetron, 72 F.3d at 345 (“Inadequate 
notice is a defect which precludes discharge of a claim in bankruptcy.”). For a thorough 
discussion on the constitutional implications of discharging future claims in bankruptcy, 
see generally Mabey & Gavrin, supra note 2. 
101 See 607 F.3d 114, 125 (3d Cir. 2010). 
102 See id.; Long, supra note 60, at 404–05; infra notes 105–111. 
103 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 123; Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1277 
(5th Cir. 1994). 
104 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 125. 
105 See Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 198, 203 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Quigley 
Co., 383 B.R. 19, 27 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); Long, supra note 60, at 400 (discussing a case 
as one of the few cases which deals with an individual who had no exposure to the product 
pre-petition). 
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of a narrow conduct theory,106 it nevertheless discussed the basic Con-
duct Test in a way that closely resembled the Pre-Petition Relationship 
Test.107 It explained how the Fourth Circuit in Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 
Inc. had applied the Conduct Test , but acknowledged that a pre-
petition relationship existed from the plaintiff’s exposure to the debt-
or’s product.108 The conduct giving rise to the claim was the plaintiff’s 
pre-petition exposure to the product when she used the contraceptive 
device.109 Therefore, although the Conduct Test does not require a pre-
petition relationship, courts applying the test recognize the implica-
tions of finding a claim based solely on the debtor’s pre-petition con-
duct and thus often assume the existence of a pre-petition relation-
ship.110 Moreover, in many cases, there is usually pre-petition contact 
between the claimant and debtor that would satisfy either test, making 
it unnecessary for courts to determine if there is a pre-petition claim 
based solely on actions of the debtor.111 
B. Unresolved Issues 
 The similarities between the Conduct Test and Pre-Petition Rela-
tionship Test add confusion to an already clouded area of law.112 
Should courts continue to apply the Conduct Test and the Pre-Petition 
Relationship Test, or do the similarities between the tests render these 
labels meaningless?113 Perhaps the answer is that one test alone is insuf-
ficient to cover cases addressing different types of claims.114 For exam-
                                                                                                                      
106 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 123 n.8. The narrow conduct theory is essentially the 
same as the pre-petition relationship test. See In re Parker, 313 F.3d 1267, 1269 n.1 (10th 
Cir. 2002). 
107 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 122–23. 
108 See id.; Grady, 839 F.2d at 199, 203; supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
109 See Grady, 839 F.2d at 203; see also Azaria, supra note 1, at 216–17 (noting that 
Grady’s claim arose pre-petition due to her pre-petition exposure to the product). 
110 See In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1995); Long, supra note 
60, at 412 (stating that in the context of mass torts, courts have generally recognized the 
need for a pre-petition relationship even when applying the Conduct Test). 
111 See, e.g., Butler v. Nationsbank, N.A., 58 F.3d 1022, 1029 (4th Cir. 1995); Concord W. 
of the Ashley Homeowners’ Assoc. v. J.A. Jones Inc., No. 3:09-cv-00182-GCM, 2010 WL 
148432, at *2 (W.D.N.C. 2010); Suntrust Bank v. Roberson, 393 B.R. 105, 110, 128 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 2008); In re U.S. Airways, 365 B.R. 624, 629–30 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007). 
112 See Bartell, supra note 15, at 342–43 (explaining the years of struggle courts have 
had applying the Code to various types of holders of possible claims). 
113 See In re Piper, 58 F.3d at 1577 (recognizing that courts applying the Conduct Test 
also presume a pre-petition relationship); Howard J. Berlin & Kris Aungst, The Fall of Fren-
ville, Norton Bankr. L. Adviser, Sept. 2010, at 1 (noting that the Grossman’s decision did 
not resolve the many conflicting tests in the circuit courts); Long, supra note 60, at 405. 
114 See Azaria, supra note 1, at 205–06 (noting the different types of claims that exist). 
40 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 
ple, a case of tort liability for asbestos exposure, unlike an indemnifica-
tion claim, may require a pre-petition relationship to address due proc-
ess concerns.115 The Third Circuit should have clarified, therefore, 
whether Grossman’s test applies only in the context of contingent tort 
claims.116 The court’s failure to do so only makes the applicability of 
the Grossman’s standard unclear and the state of claim accrual law more 
confused.117 
 Despite the Third Circuit’s application of the Pre-Petition Relation-
ship Test, the issue of notice remains unresolved.118 Courts have applied 
the Pre-Petition Relationship Test to combat the problem of lack of no-
tice to potential claimants inherent in the Conduct Test.119 But the Third 
Circuit’s application of its test reveals that this concern is not always ad-
dressed by the presence of a pre-petition relationship.120 Although Mary 
Van Brunt and Grossman’s had a pre-petition relationship due to her 
exposure to Grossman’s products, both were unaware at that time of 
Grossman’s potential liability.121 Thus, the theory that a pre-petition rela-
tionship erases the notice problems associated with the Conduct Test is 
hardly bulletproof.122 It certainly cannot address all cases involving con-
tingent tort claims effectively.123 The failure of the Grossman’s standard to 
                                                                                                                      
115 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 122, 125–26; Schweitzer v. Consol. Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 
936, 943 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that contractual claimants, unlike tort claimants, are aware 
of their relationship with the debtor which lessons the risk of inadequate notice). 
116 See 607 F.3d at 125. 
117 See Bartell, supra note 15, at 343 (recognizing the many approaches courts have 
used in determining when a claim arises); Resnick, supra note 5, at 2069–70 (discussing the 
inconsistency among federal courts in applying the broad definition of “claim”). 
118 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 125–28 (remanding case on the question of discharge). 
119 See In re Piper, 58 F.3d at 1577; Lemelle, 18 F.3d at 1277; In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 
F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991). 
120 See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 117 (noting that Grossman’s was unaware of any product 
liability lawsuits based upon exposure to asbestos products filed against it, and that Ms. Van 
Brunt was unaware of any “claim”). 
121 See id. Grossman’s did not provide actual notice to Ms. Van Brunt, and its publica-
tion notice did not indicate any future asbestos liability. See id. But see Mullane v. Cent. 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317–18 (1950) (discussing publication as an 
adequate means of notice for due process purposes when dealing with future claimants). 
122 In re Kewanee Boiler Corp., 198 B.R. 519, 532 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); Azaria, supra 
note 1, at 220. 
123 See Azaria, supra note 1, at 220. The Third Circuit in Grossman’s recognized that the 
“fair contemplation” test may be fairer to both claimants and debtors because of its focus 
on foreseeability. See 607 F.3d at 123 n.9; see also Azaria, supra note 1, at 227. This test, often 
employed by the Ninth Circuit, finds a claim when the claimant had a fair contemplation 
that a claim existed; although primarily used in environmental cases, the test has been 
applied to non-environmental claims. See Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 123 n.9 (citing In re Zilog, 
Inc., 450 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
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ameliorate the Conduct Test’s due process concerns raises questions as 
to its functional role in a contingent tort context.124 
Conclusion 
 The Third Circuit in Grossman’s faced the difficult task of trying to 
determine whether the Van Brunts’ tort claim arose pre-petition under 
the Code. Courts have struggled with the many competing tests, trying 
to best reflect Congress’s intent behind the broad definition of “claim” 
in the Code. It is especially difficult to interpret the Code’s definition as 
it applies to future tort claims. This difficulty lies in the competing ide-
als of the Constitution and Bankruptcy Code: due process for all claim-
ants on the one hand, and providing fair and efficient reorganization 
for debtors on the other. The contingent nature of asbestos claims 
makes it difficult to balance these two ideals. Although the Third Cir-
cuit decided when a future tort claim arises under the Code, a blurry 
line still remains between the Conduct and Pre-Petition Relationship 
Tests, and neither test resolves the fundamental issue of notice. 
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